

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 GENEVA 002748

SIPDIS

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DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
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DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015

TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TRIDENT
RVOSI AND TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, NOVEMBER 7, 2005

REF: A. GENEVA 2719 (JCIC-XXVII-039)

1B. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-042.

12. (U) Meeting Date: November 7, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (U) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on November 7, 2005, to further discuss outstanding
issues on the draft Coordinated Plenary Statement on Trident
RVOSI and the draft Plenary Statement for Inspections of
Tridents in Containers.

4.. (S) On the Trident II RVOSI issue, the Russians offered
specific language which would permit each of the two
subgroups to observe a single measurement. The U.S. agreed
to take the language of the proposal back to the delegation
for consideration and discuss it further at the Heads of
Delegation meeting later that day.

15. (S) After considerable discussions regarding Tridents in
Containers, the Russian and the U.S. Delegations agreed that
only two issues remained unresolved: whether two missiles
(both a Trident I and Trident II) would be removed from their
containers under the policy arrangement vice only one each
Treaty year, and the advance removal of specific hatches on
Trident liners and loading tubes prior to the beginning of
each data update inspection.

TRIDENT RVOSI

16. (S) Fedorchenko opened the Working Group meeting on
outstanding Trident issues at the Russian Mission on November
7, 2005, and recounted that the U.S. and Russia were in
agreement on all RVOSI issues except with regard to the
number of measurements to be taken with the measuring device.
He further stated that Russia remained flexible and said he
had two options to present to solve this issue. Russia's
first option, Option 1, was to have each group observe
facility personnel take successive measurements (two
measurements per group). Each group's measurements were to
be averaged, and then those two averages were to be compared
and averaged between the two groups for the official
measurement. Mullins stated that he wanted to hear Option 2.
Option 1 was essentially the same proposal Russia made last
week which the U.S. did not accept. The principal issue
between the U.S. and Russia was the number of measurements to
be taken.

17. (S) Fedorchenko then read Option 2, which stated that
each group would observe as facility personnel take one
measurement to determine length. If the difference between
those two measurements did not exceed 3 cm, the measurements
would be averaged for the official measurement. The proposal
went on to attempt to define a process for continuing to take
measurements in the event the first two measurements differed
by more than 3 cm. Following a break for the U.S. Delegation
to discuss the proposal, Mullins asked for clarification. If
the measurements were within the tolerance (benchmark +/- 3
cm), did this option consider the average of these two
measurements official? To which Fedorchenko stated "yes."
Mullins asked for the specific wording for Option 2 so that
the U.S. Delegation could take it back and study it further

and, hopefully, have a response for the scheduled Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting later in the day. Fedorchenko stated that Russia would provide the language, and said that it was time to move on to the Tridents in Container issue.

18. (S) Shevtsov added that he understood this to be an issue that could be brought to conclusion and said it would be a shame if the issue was not resolved because too much attention had been paid to this issue. Fedorchenko commented that it was in everyone's interest to solve this, to which Grinevich added he believed there was a high possibility of solving this issue.

FEDORCHENKO MENTIONS
KARTALY CLOSURE

19. (S) Before discussing the Trident agenda topics, Fedorchenko reiterated that Russia wanted to close the Kartaly site boundary reduction issue during this JCIC session. Mullins again stated that the U.S. position was to initial the S-Series Joint Statement (JS) after conducting the close-out inspection. In response to Fedorchenko's earlier comment (REF A) that he could not imagine what a JS would look like under the U.S. approach, Mullins stated that a notional illustration of what such a more simple S-Series JS might look like would be provided. Fedorchenko indicated that he now understood the U.S. approach and believed that it could satisfy Russia's concerns. Fedorchenko suggested that a simple S-Series JS could be initiated at the next session, to which Mullins stated it also could be initiated in capitals before the next JCIC session, if needed.

Begin text:

JCIC-XXVII
Draft Text
November 3, 2005

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint Statement Number S-(BLANK)

On Changes to the Boundary of the
Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement.

(2) The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.

(3) The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

..... (United States of America)
..... (Republic of Belarus)
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan)
..... (Russian Federation)
..... (Ukraine)

End text.

TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS

10. (S) On the issue of Tridents in Containers, Fedorchenko stated that the Russian Delegation was interested in hearing the U.S. response on the Russian proposal delivered the previous Friday, November 4, 2005. Text of Russian proposal follows:

Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Draft Proposed by the
Russian Side
November 4, 2005

Statement of Policy by (the Republic of Belarus,
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation,
Ukraine) Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in
Liners and Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes During
Data Update Inspections

(Name of Party) makes the following statement concerning
its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in
liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data
update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading
tube, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors, during
all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the
date of this statement, at Strategic Weapons Facility
Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic
Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia,
to use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the
indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint
Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the
Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I
and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading
tube, respectively.

(Name of Party), as a matter of policy, understands that
the inspection teams may request a verification removal of an
SLBM of each of these types from its liner or loading tube no
more than once each year.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States
of America that safety and security considerations and time
constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale
Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base will not permit
all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000
demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes
containing SLBMs. (Name of Party) understands that some
access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will
already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of
unique features of the missiles to confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading
tubes during future inspections, (name of Party) will
instruct its inspectors to use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the
in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June
2000 demonstrations.

For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or
loading tube, respectively. The inspection team, as
necessary during the inspection, may request all access
hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be
removed from these liners or loading tubes.

The United States of America will respond to any such
requests to remove these access hatches from particular
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not
deviate from established safety and security procedures.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States
of America that inspection time constraints may limit the
number of additional access hatches that can be removed
during an inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the United States of
America will be prepared to implement the above procedures
for each data update inspection that is conducted at the
Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base
beginning 30 days from the date of this statement.

(Name of Party) notes that this statement of policy, and
the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this
matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the
first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings
Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the
date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days,

no party raises questions through diplomatic channels that:

1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;

2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm missile type using the procedures contained in the statements of policy; and,

3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the use of the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth above.

Statement of Policy by the United States of America
Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and
Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes
During Data Update Inspections

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading tube, the United States of America expects that, during all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the date of this statement at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, inspection teams will use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading tube, respectively.

The United States of America understands that the inspection teams may request a verification removal of an SLBM of each of these types from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year.

The United States of America notes that safety and security considerations and time constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine Bases will not permit all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs. The United States of America also notes that some access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during future inspections, the United States of America will use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 2000 demonstrations.

For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or loading tube, respectively. The inspection team, as necessary during the inspection, may request all access hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading tubes.

The United States of America will respond to any such requests to remove these access hatches from particular liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not deviate from established safety and security procedures.

The United States of America notes that inspection time constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches that can be removed during an inspection.

The United States of America will be prepared to implement the above procedures for each data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date

of this statement.

The United States of America notes that this statement of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that:

- 1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;
- 2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm missile type using the procedures contained in the statements of policy; and,
- 3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

The United States of America understands that the use of the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring of the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth above.

End text.

¶11. (S) Mullins stated the revised Russian text was not helpful and that the Parties were now farther apart. Mullins further stated that the United States had four issues with regard to the Russian proposal and he would address them in order.

¶12. (S) The first issue was Russia's inclusion of language specifying that two missiles be removed vice the U.S. proposal of only one missile to be removed each Treaty year. Mullins stated that the U.S. maintains that there should be no need for Russia to request more than one missile to be removed under this policy arrangement. He stated that the U.S. has made it clear, and that Russia understands, that the U.S. acknowledges Russia's right to request a missile be removed if an inspector is unable to determine the type of missile after using the prescribed procedures. Mullins then addressed the second issue.

"VERIFICATION" REMOVAL;
HATCHES; AND TREATY
BASIS FOR PROCEDURES

¶13. (S) Mullins questioned Russia's inclusion of the words "verification removal" to describe this new proposed policy pull. Mullins stated that there is no such type of removal and the U.S. has no intention of creating such a distinction. Mullins further stated that the removal of a missile from a container addressed in this Statement of Policy is simply a removal and should be called such.

¶14. (S) Mullins pointed out that the latest Russian text still specified the hatches to be removed during data update inspections. He stated that the United States did not believe specific hatches needed to be identified in the policy statement. Mullins reiterated that it was in the United States' best interest to ensure that hatches were removed to allow Russian inspectors to properly identify the missile contained within and, thus, specific hatches did not need to be identified in the policy statement.

¶15. (S) Mullins also questioned Russia's proposed movement of an entire paragraph within the text. On the original U.S. proposed draft (REF A), the paragraph in question was located on the first page as the third paragraph. On the Russian proposal, the paragraph was moved to the final paragraph of the document. Mullins explained that the United States believed this paragraph should remain at the beginning of the document, because it establishes the Treaty basis upon which these supplemental measures of the policy statement are proposed. Mullins concluded by stating that this issue was important and the U.S. would like to work with the other Parties to bring this to closure.

FEDORCHENKO RESPONDS

¶16. (S) Fedorchenko addressed each issue raised by the U.S. He stated first that Russia should have the opportunity to request removal of one each of the Trident I and Trident II because both missiles are in the U.S. inventory. He stated that some progress could be made, in that the Parties could

make an agreement on the Trident II only, provided that the U.S. would provide information on the future of the Trident I missiles. Fedorchenko addressed the use of the word "verification inspection" and stated Russia was simply trying to distinguish this type of removal. He stated that if this were the only obstacle to resolving this issue, Russia would remove this proposed wording. Fedorchenko addressed the third issue, removal of hatches. He stated that, since this was a statement of policy, Russia felt it should be specific and the description was needed to bring clarity to the policy. Fedorchenko then addressed the last issue of the paragraph move. He stated that Russia believed this paragraph could be removed completely; that it simply reiterated a Treaty right. However, he explained that it did establish the relationship between the new proposed policy right and a Treaty right. Mullins asked for clarification of why Russia felt this paragraph could be excluded, to which Fedorchenko stated, because the right to remove a missile for confirmation of missile type is already prescribed in the Inspection Protocol of the Treaty and no one has questioned or challenged this right. He further stated that the last few words of the paragraph could be kept, as they set up this new proposed policy. Mullins stated that he understood and would take this issue back to the U.S. Delegation.

¶17. (S) Mullins returned to the hatch removal issue, stating that he understood Russia's desire for clarification on U.S. procedures, but the U.S. did not feel this was necessary because it remained in the United States' best interest to have sufficient hatches removed to allow Russian inspectors to verify content. Mullins stated that the U.S. did not want to tie the hands of the Navy to the removal of specific hatches, as each facility may operate differently. Fedorchenko stated that, since there were other insurmountable disagreements with this policy, Russia would take this issue back for consideration during the intersession. Mullins replied that the U.S. would take this back also, but added that, back in 2000, Russia was satisfied with the results of the Trident I demonstration, so during the intersession the U.S. would concentrate on Trident II, specifically with respect to hatch removal.

¶18. (S) Mullins then addressed the use of the term "verification removal." Mullins stated that, since Fedorchenko said Russia did not see this as a point of contention, he assumed this was no longer a show-stopper. Fedorchenko stated that Russia could easily agree to the deletion of the word "verification," thus bringing closure to this particular point. However, Fedorchenko proceeded to explain a "nuance" with regard to the terminology. He stated that the proposed text for the Parties, other than the U.S., could stand without this term since it stated "as a matter of policy." Deletion of the term, "verification removal," from the U.S. text, on the other hand, would be more painful from the Russian perspective since the U.S. text does not include the same phrasing.

¶19. (S) Mullins addressed the issue of requesting removal of one versus two missiles per Treaty year. Mullins refocused the discussion to the point that, in 2000, both Parties felt that the Trident I issue was resolved, even though the Parties did not complete any statement of specific policy on Trident I. This, along with the fact that Trident I missiles were no longer deployed and were leaving the inventory, should ease the other Parties' minds and, thus, there should be no need to ever request removal of a Trident I in the future. Concluding, Mullins stated that the U.S. would consider this issue in Washington during the intersession. Two substantive issues remained: The number of missiles subject to removal (either only Trident II or one of each type, Trident I and II), and which hatches, if any, that should be specified in the agreement for removal. Shevtsov spoke up and recommended deleting the term "verification" from the draft statements, focusing efforts on Trident II removal, deleting the paragraph in question (which Russia moved to the end), and not including specific hatches to remove for Trident verification but rather just stating in the policy "as done in the demonstration."

¶20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Working Paper containing "Option 2" wording for Trident RVOSI, unofficial English translation from Russian, undated.

¶21. (U) Participants:
U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Smith
Dr. Zimmerman
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenco

Col Razumov

Ms. Kotkova

Lt Col Novikov

Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Sorokina

Mr. Fokin (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov

Col Taran

¶22. (U) Taylor sends.

Moley